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HOW DIFFERENT TYPES OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES COULD
SAVE MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL TEAMS FROM CONTRACTION
by Brad Smith*

I. INTRODUCTION

Laws concerning ownership structures have played a key role in
determining the success and growth of domestic and international professional
sports leagues and their teams. There are four different types of ownership
structures found throughout professional sports. These include public in the
form of stock ownership, public in the form of community ownership, private,
and single entity. When analyzing these different forms of ownership, there are
several significant issues that leagues and their teams must face and deal with in
the course of their operations to maintain their existence. These issues include
antitrust laws, United States versus Canadian, British, and Japanese laws, league
rules preventing public/community ownership, and league revenue-sharing
plans.' Currently, some domestic (Florida Marlins, Minnesota Twins, and
Tampa Bay Devil Rays) and international (Montreal Expos) Major League
Baseball teams are dealing with the threat of contraction due in large part to
problems with their ownership structures.2
By introducing community
ownership, which is currently illegal in professional baseball, into the sport,
these teams would likely stand a much better chance of surviving and remaining
in the same city without the fears of contraction and the need to move to another
city.
Therefore, this Note advocates the introduction of community
ownership combined with an effective revenue-sharing plan in Major League
Baseball to assist in alleviating the financial difficulties plaguing some of its
teams. Part II analyzes recent cases dealing with contraction in baseball and the
long and short-term effects of contraction on the sport. Part III discusses public
ownership, where marketable securities are sold on the stock market and public
* Mr. Smith is a student at the Hofstra University School of Law. He wishes to thank Professor
Grant Hayden for his assistance and guidance throughout the writing of this Note.
1 PAUL J. MUCH, 1997 INSIDE THE OWNERSHIP OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS TEAMs 27-28, (Team
Marketing Report, Inc., Chicago 1997).
2 Mark S. Rosentraub, BASEBALL IN THE GLOBAL ERA: ECONOMIC, LEGAL, AND
CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE: Governing Sports in the GlobalEra: A PoliticalEconomy of Maor
League Baseballand Its Stakeholders, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 121, 142 (2000).
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companies own the teams, and outlines the advantages and disadvantages of
such a structure in professional sports. Part IV explores private ownership,
where private investors or privately-held corporations have majority stakes in a
professional sports franchise. Part V explains the idea of public ownership in
the form of community ownership, where the non-marketable securities are sold
and the public (mainly the team's fans) owns the majority of the stock in the
franchise. Part VI concludes this Note by demonstrating the importance of
allowing for community ownership within Major League Baseball and how such
a structure would benefit the sport.
II.

CONTRACTION IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL

Without a doubt, contraction has recently posed a significant threat to
some of Major League Baseball's (MLB's) franchises. In late 2001, rumors
began circulating that MLB was considering the possibility of contracting at
least two franchises prior to the 2002 season due to their financial problems. 3
However, with their new Collective Bargaining Agreement, baseball has tabled
contraction and put off further possibilities of it until 2007.4 However,
contraction still poses a very real threat to these teams because they are not
really improving financially and appear to continue facing major economic
difficulties until 2007.
Recently, two court decisions came about as a result of Major League
Baseball's decision on November 6, 2001 to contract two teams - -MLB would
go from 30 to 28 teams- - for the 2002 seasoni In response to the December 31,
2001 decision to move forward with contraction after negotiations with the
Players Association failed and pursuant to his statutory authority to investigate
possible violations of federal and state antitrust laws, the Attorney General of
the State of Florida issued civil investigative demands to baseball,
Commissioner Bud Selig, the Florida Marlins and Tampa Bay Devil Rays
(collectively the "plaintiffs"). 6 The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive
relief against the Attorney General with their claim that the decision to contract
was exempt from federal and state antitrust laws.7
The district court began analyzing the dispute by noting "the business
of baseball is, as it is sometimes phrased, exempt from antitrust laws." g The
district court disagreed with the Attorney General's argument that the exemption
only applied to the reserve clause and discussed the United States Supreme
Court cases upholding MLB's exemption, including Federal Baseball Club v.

3 Paul Anderson, Recent Major League BaseballContractionCases, at

http://www.marquette.eduIaw/sports/sfr/mlbcases.sfr31.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2003).

4 ALLAN SIMPSON, BASEBALL AMERICA ALMANAC 2003 8 (Baseball America, Inc., 2003).

5 See Anderson, supra note 3.
6 See id.

7 See id.
8 Major League Baseball v. Butterworth, 181 F. Supp.2d 1316, 1322 (2001)
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National League and Flood v. Kuhn.9 The district court explained that,
according to these cases, the business of baseball and the reserve clause were
both exempt from antitrust laws since 1922, and the Supreme Court has
"repeatedly stated that it is up to Congress to overrule this exemption and not the
courts."' 0
The court also said that contraction is part of the business of baseball
and that "the basic league structure, including the number of teams, remains an
essential feature of the business of baseball, exempt from the antitrust laws.""
The court added that because the Florida Antitrust Act explicitly exempts the
same subjects as are exempt under the federal antitrust laws, the decision to
contract was exempt from all federal and state antitrust laws.12 In the end, the
court granted the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction barring the
Attorney General from issuing any civil legislative demands. 3
In another contraction case, the plaintiff, the Metropolitan Sports
Facilities Commission (a Minnesota governmental entity operating the
Metrodome, home to the Minnesota Twins) sued the defendant, the Minnesota
Twins Major League Baseball Club, seeking a declaratory judgment requiring
the Twins to fulfill its one-year use agreement with the Commission.' 4 The
Commission alleged "that the Twins sought to circumvent their contractual
obligations by selling their franchise to Major League Baseball for $250 million
and that the league would then terminate the franchise."' 15 In September 2001,
the Twins exercised their lease option with the Commission through the 2002
season.16 According to their lease with the Commission, the Twins could opt
out of their lease "only if theforce majeure clause applied and they were unable
to play a home game for a reason beyond the Team's and the Commission's
17
control, including strikes, an act of God, a natural casualty, or a court order."'
The Commission feared that a decision to contract the Twins from
MLB would cause the team to break its one year lease agreement.18 As a result,
on November 6, 2001, the Commission filed a declaratory judgment action
seeking "specific performance of the use agreement and an injunction
preventing Major League Baseball from interfering with the Commission's
contractual relationships with the Twins."' 19 On November 16, 2001, the district
court granted the Commission's motion for a temporary injunction.20

9 See Anderson, supra note 3. FederalBaseball Club v. NationalLeague, 259 U.S. 200 (1922),
Floodv. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972)
1oSee id.

1 See Butterworth, supranote 8, at 1332.
12 See Anderson, supra note 3.
13 See id.
14See id.
15 Metro. Sports Facilities Comm'n v. Minnesota Twins P'ship, 638 N.W.2d 214, 220 (Ct. App.
Minn., 2002).
16 See Anderson, supranote 3.
17See Metro. Sports Facilities Comm'n, supra note 15, at 219.
is See Anderson, supranote 3.
19See Metro. Sports Facilities Comm'n, supra note 15, at 219-220.
20 See Anderson, supranote 3.
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On appeal by the Twins and MLB, the Minnesota Court Of Appeals
affirmed the district court's decision to grant the temporary injunction and made
several specific findings. 21 Among the Court of Appeals' conclusions was their
determination that it was unlikely that monetary damages would fully
compensate the Commission if the Twins breach the lease agreement since there
are a number of intangible benefits that communities receive by hosting
professional sports franchises, such as community goodwill and a source of
family entertainment. 22 The Court of Appeals also found that the Commission
established a likelihood of success on the merits by demonstrating that: (1)"the
Twins exercised their option to lease the Metrodome for the 2002 baseball
23
season, obligating themselves to play 2002 home games at the Metrodome;
(2) "the schedule has been published and the Twins are selling season tickets for
the games;, 24 (3) "for contraction of the Twins to occur, the owner must
voluntarily agree to sell the team; '25 (4) "elimination of the Twins franchise
would result in a breach of the use agreement. 26 The Minnesota Court of
Appeals concluded that public policy supported issuance of the temporary
injunction because "local professional sports franchises are an important
community asset and should fulfill their contractual obligations. 27 Thus, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court.28
Other factors must be considered when analyzing the Major League
Baseball contraction issue. To avoid lengthy and possibly unsuccessful
litigation, the teams that would be contracted must also fold voluntarily,
meaning that they must regard the sales price being paid to them as attractive.29
From the standpoint of those teams that might fold, contraction will only be
attractive "if the price paid is roughly equal to the market value of the franchise
if it were sold as a continuing enterprise., 30 The market price of these teams
would likely be much greater if they can relocate to another city. 31 If MLB
offered substantially less than the value of the team in the best alternative
location, an option available to an owner of a team facing contraction would be
to sue baseball for damages "equal to the difference between the price that
baseball offered and the value of the team elsewhere. 3 Additionally, if MLB
follows its own rules, it may only force a team to fold if it is seriously violating
the league's rules or not fielding a representative professional team.33
23

See id.

2'See id.
2 See Metro. Sports Facilities Comm'n, supra note 15, at 226.
24 See id.
2
26
27

See id.
See id.
See Metro. Sports Facilities Comm'n, supra note 15, at 228.

28 See Anderson, supra note 3.
29 Roger G. Noll, The Economics of Baseball Contraction,STANFORD INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC
POLICY RESEARCH 1, 2 (Jan. 2002).
30 See id.
31 See id.
32 See id.
at 4.
3 See id.
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However, it is important to realize that there are other important legal
ramifications when dealing with contraction and there are more costs involved
than simply buying the team. 34 According to Andrew Zimbalist, a Professor of
Economics at Smith College and author of BASEBALL AND BILLIONS, "Attorney
Generals in various states looking to get baseball or keep teams would sue
baseball on grounds they're a monopoly and restricting output. 3 5 A potential
liability for the owners is the "unexpired portions of the stadium leases of the
teams that are being eliminated. 36 If a team breaks a lease, Major League
Baseball will likely have to pay damages to the stadium authority.37
Another possible liability if contraction occurs would be "the unexpired
portion of multi-year contracts for players who do not make another majorleague roster." 38 Folding two teams will eliminate at least 50 major league
positions.39 It is extremely likely that at least some of these players, who will be
released or demoted to the minor leagues, will file a grievance if they do not
make another major-league roster and their salary commitments in their current
contracts are not paid.4°
Additionally, further liability will arise from folding twelve minor
league franchises that had working arrangements with the two major league
teams that were contracted. 4l Due to the fact that many minor league teams are
valued in the millions, Major League Baseball faces the possibility of essentially
being forced to buy out these twelve minor league clubs as well as two major
league teams at a total cost of over $50-$75 million. 42 Overall, it's likely to cost
over $500 million to fold two major league teams.43 Furthermore, MLB may
also be required to pay damages for breach of contract for each of the stadiums
where these minor league teams play."4
Besides all of these legal burdens, contraction could have a definite
negative impact on baseball's relations with its fans and players. Some fans
could be "sufficiently repelled" by contraction, and this will result in lower
attendance throughout baseball and fewer people watching fewer games on
television. 45 If contraction precipitated another MLB strike, it's likely that the
losses to baseball would be massive among the fans.46 Additionally, contraction
would most likely spark a significant battle with the player's union that would
hurt the game and cause a rift between management and the players.47 As a
34 See id at 5.
35 Chris Isidore, Why 'Out'isthe Wrong Call(Oct. 5, 2001), at
http://money.cnn.comi2001/10/05/iving/column-sportsbiz/
36 See Noll, supranote 29, at 5.
37See id.
38 See id.
'9See id
40 See id
41 See id.
at 6.
42 See id.
43 See id.
4 See id.
4 See id.at 8-9.
46 See id.
at 9.
47See Isidore, supra note 35.
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result, alternative ownership structures, such as community ownership, are
viable options for Major League Baseball to explore in order to help in
preventing these significant negative effects of contraction.

III. PUBLIC OWNERSHIP-WHERE MARKETABLE SECURITIES ARE SOLD

A. History/Background
The first type of ownership in professional sports is public ownership,
where marketable securities are sold. Professional teams in the United States
with this type of ownership included the National Basketball Association's
(NBA's) Boston Celtics, National Hockey League's (NHL's) Florida Panthers,
and Major League Baseball's (MLB's) Cleveland Indians. 48 The Celtics were
owned by a limited partnership, Boston Celtics LP, which was listed on the New
York Stock Exchange since 1986, and were the last major independently owned
public sports franchise until being sold to a group of private investors in 2002. 49
Similarly, the Panthers, whose parent holding company, Florida Panthers
Holdings Inc., carried out a public offering of shares on the NASDAQ exchange
in 1996, were also recently sold to private investors. 50 The Indians had an IPO
in 1998 and then were purchased by a private investor in 2000. 51 Formerly,
Major League Baseball's Baltimore Orioles, the NBA's Cleveland Cavaliers, the
NBA's Milwaukee Bucks, and the National Football League's (NFL's) New
England Patriots were all publicly owned, but are now privately owned 2
Internationally, British professional soccer teams, Japanese baseball teams, and
the NHL's Edmonton (Canada) Oilers are publicly owned." Formerly, two
other NHL teams were publicly owned-the Toronto (Canada) Maple Leafs and
the Vancouver (Canada) Canucks, but now are privately owned 4
There has been a decade long trend of public company ownership.
Public corporations often from the media, entertainment, and communications
industries purchased sports franchises throughout the 1990s.5
Tribune
Company bought MLB's Chicago Cubs and News Corp. purchased MLB's Los
Angeles Dodgers.5 6 Furthermore, cross-ownership also has increased, especially

48

Eugene J. Stroz, Public Ownership of Sports Franchises:Investment, Novelty, orFraud?, 53

RUTGERS L. REV. 517, 520 (2001).

49 Daniel Kaplan, Publicfirms retreatfrom owners box, STREET & SMITH's SPORTS BUSINESS
JOURNAL, Oct. 7-13, 2002, at 1.
50 Scott C. Lascari, The Latest Revenue Generator: Stock Sales By Professional Sports Franchises, 9
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 445, 454 (1999).
51 See Stroz, supra note 48, at 528-529.
52 See Much, supranote 1, at 15.
53 Brian R. Cheffims, Sports Teams and the Stock Market: A Winning Match?, 32 U.B.C. L. REV.
271, 276 (1998).
'4 See id. at 272.
5 See Much, supranote 1, at 27.
5 See Kaplan, supra note 49, at 46.
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in the NBA, NHL and MLB, where corporations own a team from each league.57
For example, Cablevision Systems utilizes cross-ownership by owning the
NBA's New York Knicks and the NHL's New York Rangers, while Comcast
Corp. owns the NBA's Philadelphia 76ers and the NHL's Philadelphia Flyers.58
AOL Time Warner bought the NHL's Atlanta Thrashers, the NBA's Atlanta
Hawks, and MLB's Atlanta Braves (from Ted Turner), while Walt Disney
Company purchased the NHL's Anaheim Mighty Ducks and MLB's Anaheim
Angels. 59
However, it looks like this decade long trend of public company
ownership of professional sports franchises may be reversing. Half of the
twelve U.S. teams owned by public companies are or are on the verge of shifting
into the hands of private investors.60 Besides the Celtics sale, the Disney Co.
hired an investment bank to sell its two Anaheim sports teams and AOL Time
Warner said it was considering selling non-core assets, including their three
Atlanta sports teams.61 In addition, there's speculation that Canadian cable
operator Roger Communications, owner of MLB's Toronto Blue Jays, is
considering selling the team. 62 Major media conglomerates are questioning their
commitment to continuing sports franchise ownership.63 Without a doubt, it's
extremely important for these public companies to assess the advantages and
disadvantages of prolonging their ownership of these sports franchises.
B. Advantages/ReasonsFor Public Company Ownership of Sports Franchises
There are several reasons why the ownership of teams might
arrange an initial public offering (IPO) of shares. 64 Often, the main purpose of
"going public" is to raise cash to fund business activities which cannot be
readily financed by other means, such as from profits generated by the
corporation, from the pockets of existing shareholders, or by borrowing. 65 For
example, several professional British soccer teams carried out an IPO to raise
cash to improve their existing stadium or to build a new facility. 66 Additionally,
British soccer teams utilize the stock market to raise funds for other reasons,
such as financing the purchase of players in order to "buy success" and
See Much, supranote 1, at 91.
s See id.
59 See Kaplan, supranote 49, at 46.
6 See id. at 1. These teams are the NBA's Boston Celtics, MLB's Anaheim Angels, NHL's
Anaheim Mighty Ducks, MLB's Atlanta Braves, NBA's Atlanta Hawks, and NHL's Atlanta
Thrashers.
61 See id. Some believe that Disney is unhappy with the pro sports business because it doesn't
provide the "visible day-to-day revenue" that a theme park produces. See Paul White, Twenty
questions about contraction,USA TODAY BASEBALL WEEKLY (Nov. 21, 2001), at
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/bbw/200 1-11-14/2001-11-14-contraction.html.
62 Ben Silverman, Media ownersfoul out on pro teams, NEW YORK POST, Nov. 17, 2002, at 30.
6 See Kaplan, supra note 49, at 1.
64 See Cheffins, supranote 53, at 275.
65 Brian R. Cheffins, UK FootballClubs and the Stock Market: PastDevelopments and Future
Prospects: Part1, 18 COMPANY LAWYER 66 (1997).
6 See id. at 67.
57
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strengthen their teams. However, this buying of players does not occur as often
in the United States due to the leagues placing tight restrictions on the sale of
players for cash.67 Instead, teams fill their rosters by other means, such as
68
through trades, farm and minor league clubs, player drafts, and free agency,
which involves signing a player after his contract with another team has
expired. 69 However, it is quite possible that in the future, MLB, NBA, NFL,
and NHL teams might seek to raise funds through an IPO in order to strengthen
the quality of their rosters. 70 Especially in recent times, teams frequently need to
pay players a substantial signing bonus along with a high annual salary, so
selling shares to the public could serve to ensure that the cash required to
conclude negotiations is readily available. 7' Moreover, U.S. teams also could
raise funds through this form of ownership for new stadium construction.
There are additional factors providing an impetus for teams to raise
funds by selling shares on the stock market. Existing owners of a privately-held
business often desire an "exit option. 72 Due to the fact that equity in a private
corporation can be difficult to sell, going public is beneficial to these owners
because it provides them with an opportunity for shareholders to liquidate at
least part of their investment.73 Besides the stock market providing an "exit
option" where the owners can arrange to have some of their shares distributed as
part of an IPO, it is also possible for these individuals to rely at a later date on
the liquidity that stock exchange listing typically creates and sell equity on the
market.7 a
Large publicly-quoted corporations are also potential buyers of sports
franchises, due in part to the fact that they are better able than most to pay the
high "going rate" prices for ownership rights.75 These corporations have access
to personnel, money, and marketing capabilities which provides them with the
potential to operate the franchise more profitably than would be possible under
private ownership. 76 Moreover, large public corporations can derive significant
subsidiary benefits from sports ownership because a team can complement its
other operations.77 For example, MLB's Atlanta Braves provides valuable
programming for Time Warner's TBS channel and the Los Angeles Dodgers do
the same for the News Corporation via its Fox television empire.78 The logic
67 See Cheffins, supra note 53, at 276.

6 See id.

69 See id.

70See id.
"' W.J. Hoffman, Dallas' Head Cowboy Emerges Victorious in a Licensing Showdown with the
NFL: NationalFootballLeague Propertiesv. Dallas Cowboys FootballClub, et al., SETON HALL J.
OF SPORTS LAW 255 at 285 (1997).
72 G. McDonald, Sports Teams ]POs Score a Following, THE GLOBE & MAIL, June 22, 1998, at B 1.

73See Cheffins, supra note 53, at 277.
74See id.
75J. Colangelo, Is Corporate Ownership Good For Baseball?, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, June 28,
1997, at C 1.
76See Cheffins, supranote 53, at 278.
" See id.at 277.

n J. Crasnick, DodgerBlue or the Color of Money, THE DENVER POST, June 29, 1997, at C16; see
also P. Farhi, Murdoch Agrees to Buy Dodgers, THE WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 5, 1997, at Cl.
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behind owning professional sports teams for these media companies is that it is
cheaper to own teams than to pay continuously rising broadcast fees for the
team's games. 79 Additionally, "by televising the teams in new regional sports
channels, the cable companies could attract subscribers looking for sports while
adding relatively inexpensive programming to their operations." 80
The wealth of a corporate team could improve the viability of a
professional league because if these wealthy teams are successful, there will be
more successful teams in the league, which will increase the league's overall
strength and help in maintaining a competitive balance. In the NFL, where
there's a comprehensive revenue-sharing system, a successful team will increase
the "revenue pie" and provide more income for other franchises. 81 Likewise,
corporate-owned teams could also increase the value of every individual
franchise. For instance, with the sale of MLB's Los Angeles Dodgers to Rupert
Murdoch's News Corp. for a reported price of approximately $311 million,
analysts estimated that this transaction
increased the value of all other MLB
82
franchises by ten to twenty percent.
In Britain, during the mid- 1990s, "growing crowds, higher ticket prices,
generous sponsorship deals, and a lucrative new television package meant that
revenues increased substantially" for many U.K. soccer teams causing investor
confidence to be extremely high. 3 As a result, successful IPOs continued in the
U.K. throughout late 1996 and early 1997 and investor confidence continued to
grow.8 4 Public ownership of U.K. soccer teams at this point seemed to be ideal
because the teams were quite successful and profitable and therefore the
investors received higher returns, so this was an ideal business model for these
clubs and their investors.
Another advantage of public ownership of soccer teams are the benefits
that the fans have received. During the 1990s, there was a massive upgrading of
stadiums in English and Scottish soccer leagues, and this was significantly
financed by funds raised on the stock market.8 5 As a result, these teams had
rising attendance figures and received positive responses in surveys from the
fans.8 6 Additionally, many of these publicly-quoted soccer teams experienced
more success on the field due, in part, to the availability of a greater amount of
funds to get more talented players. For instance, Manchester United and

79 See Kaplan, supranote 49, at 46.

See id,
81Alan J. Ostfield, Seat License Revenue in the NationalFootballLeague: Shareable or Not?, 5
8'

SETON HALL J. OF SPORTS LAW
82

599, 604 (1995).

Ross Newhan, These Guys Should Know How to Communicate, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1998, at

W3.
83 See Cheffins, supra note 53, at 283.
8

See id.

Brian R. Cheffins, UK FootballClubs and the Stock Market: Past Developments and Future
Prospects:Part 2, 18 COMPANY LAWYER 66 (1997).
85

16

See id.
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Chelsea, two of England's most successful soccer clubs, are both owned by
stock exchange companies.
C. Disadvantages/Problems With Public Company Ownership of Sports
Franchises
However, there are numerous factors that serve as deterrents to owners
of professional sports teams from selling shares on the stock market. One
significant hurdle is that there is often opposition from league officials.88
Professional leagues, such as MLB, NBA, NHL, and NFL, have policies
regulating the transfer of ownership of teams and owners typically have been
discouraged from selling a stake in their teams to the public.8 9 While MLB
franchise owners voted to amend league rules to allow their teams to join the
stock market, no greater than 49% of a team may be distributed by way of an
IPO and voting rights of publicly held shares must be restricted. 90 Basically,
baseball's intentions are to ensure that a majority stake remains in private hands.
Similarly, while the owners of NHL franchises have expressed willingness to
endorse plans to offer shares to the public, the NIHL has a league by-law
requiring that one shareholder have ultimate voting control. 91 For example,
Wayne Huizenga complied with these NHL requirements when carrying out his
Florida Panthers IPO by issuing Class A shares to the public, which was allowed
one vote per share, and by holding for himself super-powered Class B shares,
each of which had 10,000 votes per share.92
Additionally, the NFL is significantly more firmly opposed to public
ownership of teams than the other leagues. 93 The NFL Constitution prohibits
corporate ownership of franchises, and 75% of the NFL's owners must approve
all transfers of ownership interests in a NFL team. 94 Furthermore, there is an
"uncodified" league policy that prohibits public offerings of shares in NFL
clubs. 95 However, the legality of such an arrangement prohibiting IPO's
remains "in considerable doubt" and is a significant issue.96 In two cases arising
from disputes associated with the sale of the New England Patriots in the late
1980's, it was held that enforcement of NFL policies concerning public
ownership can violate U.S. antitrust laws as an unreasonable restraint of trade.97

87 See Cheffims, supranote 53, at 289.

" See id.at 279.
89 See Cheffins, supranote 65, at 70.
90 See Cheffins, supranote 53, at 279.

9' See id
92 Robert Bacon, Initial Public Offerings and ProfessionalSports Teams: The Regulations Work;
ButAre Owners andInvestorsListening?, 10 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 139, 150 (2000).
93 See Cheffins, supranote 53, at 279.

94 See id.
9' See id.
96 See id.
97 Sullivan v. National Football League, 34 F.3d 1091 (1V Cir. 1994) (The primary authority for the
NFL's prohibition of public ownership violating antitrust law). See also Murray v. National Football
League, No. CIV Aa. 94-5971, WL 363911 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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Furthermore, the NFL has expressed several other concerns, including
fears that publicly owned corporations could potentially provide more capital
than any current owners. 9 This availability of greater funds would give publicly
owned teams an unfair competitive advantage. 99 As a result, the NFL fears that
if such a competitive advantage exists, a few teams will dominate the League,
and this coupled with a lack of interesting rivalries, would cause a decline in fan
support and potentially the demise of the NFL.'0° Therefore, parity is one of the
main goals of the NFL, as demonstrated by former NFL Commissioner Pete
Rozelle saying, "On any given Sunday, any team can beat any other."'' 1
The NFL also worries that public ownership will result in "undue
commercialization of the NFL."' 10 2 The League fears that certain corporations
would view owning a professional football franchise as a means of promoting
their other businesses. 103 For example, if a corporation, such as Disney, bought
a football franchise, the NFL fears that the focus of this franchise would shift
from promoting football to advertising for Disney and its various products. As a
result, the NFL believes that such ownership would not be in its best interests
because the other interests of the owner would take away from the sport as a
whole.
Additionally, practical considerations can also play a significant role in
discouraging owners of a professional sports team from carrying out an IPO.1°4
The prospect of disclosing a wide range of previously confidential information
can deter business owners from selling shares on the stock market. 0 5 In order
for a corporation to carry out an IPO in both the U.S. and Canada, legislation,
such as the Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934, mandates that it
must disclose a wide range of information. 10 6 Additionally, the corporation
owning the team will then have to meet continuing obligations imposed by
securities laws and the various rules of the stock exchanges on which its equity
is traded. 10 7 Due to these requirements, public corporations must provide
detailed information on numerous components of their business, including their
sales and profits, the compensation of top executives, and the activities of
certain key shareholders.10 8 However, league policies discouraging owners from
going to the stock market were developed in large part to prevent team finances
from being inspected by the media, government officials, or players seeking

98 Sullivan , 34 F.3d, at 1100.
99 Richard Demak, CorporatelyYours, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 3, 1991, at 15.

1'0 See id.
101Glenn Dickey, NFL parity meansfewer dynasties but better competition, PRO FOOTBALL
WEEKLY (Dec. 11, 2000), at
http://www.archive.profootballweekly.com/content/archives/features-2000/dickey 121 100.asp.
102 See id.
103 See id.
104 See Cheffins, supranote 53, at 279.
'o5 See id.
106 See id.
107 See id.
'0o See id.at 280.
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background information for contract negotiations.109

These factors play a

significant role in forcing owners to adjust to life in the public eye which is not
always desirable and could deter owners of individual sports teams from
carrying out IPOs. 110
Internationally, sports franchises have showed a reluctance to enter the
stock market due to a disdain of the "external scrutiny" they would face from
investors and financial service professionals."' Some privately-held British
soccer teams chose to forgo the stock market and not go public due to their
disinterest in dealing with such heavy scrutiny. 1 2 For instance, in 1995, the
chairman of the Glasgow Rangers, a very successful Scottish soccer
club, chose
113
not to issue an IPO and allow his club to become publicly held.
Besides these disclosure obligations, another undesirable feature of
public ownership and selling shares on the stock market is the cost, in terms of
both time commitments and financial expenditures. 114 When carrying out an
IPO, the management team must engage in long and significant discussions
about the relevant issues concerning ownership with lawyers, accountants, and
financial advisors. 115 In terms of costs, lawyers, accountants, and investment
bankers all charge fees when they help to organize an IPO, so the owners will
have numerous expenses. 16 For instance, a $5 million IPO might cost the
owners $700,000.1 17 Furthermore, these financial costs are ongoing as expenses
will be incurred in meeting reporting and disclosure obligations under securities
law and stock exchange rules."
Recently, these administrative burdens
involved with public ownership have discouraged at least one U.S. sports team,
the NBA's Sacramento Kings, from following through on plans to carry out an
IPO during the late 1990's. 19
An additional factor that often deters public ownership is the problem
with gaining and maintaining shareholder and investor confidence. Moving
forward with an IPO is only a feasible option if there are investors willing to buy
the shares at a price approaching that sought by the owners of the business. 120 If
an IP0 is likely to fail due to "adverse investor sentiment," corporations will
typically abandon their plans before actually making the shares available for

'09 ProfessionalSports Team Stocks Suddenly Seem to be on a Roll, THE TAMPA TRIBUNE, Feb. 18,

1997, at B7.
"o See Cheffins, supra note 53, at 280.

1 See id

112 See id.
113 j. Ivison,

Murray Rules Out Suggestions of Share Flotationfor Rangers,THE SCOTSMAN, Oct.

27, 1995, at 21.
114 See Cheffins, supra note 53, at 280.
15 L. Ginsberg, The Prosand Cons of Taking a Business Public, THE GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 5, 1998,
at BIt.
116 See Cheffins, supra note 53, at 280.
117See id. at 280.
118See id
119G. Delsohn, Questions and Answers Surroundingthe Kings'Existence in Sacramento,THE
Jan. 23, 1997, at CI.
See Cheffins, supra note 53, at 282.
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sale. 21 Adverse investor sentiment posed a problem with public offerings of
professional soccer shares in the UK in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 122 Many
financial professionals were suspicious of business practices at soccer clubs and,
as a result, they strongly doubted whether teams could ever be rated on "normal
investment criteria" and be "genuine stock market businesses."' 1 23 Due to this
inherent suspicion of the soccer teams, early IPOs received an unwelcome
reception and this caused many U.K. soccer teams to completely
shy away from
124
utilizing the stock market as part of their ownership structure.
In the U.S., publicly owned companies have faced difficult challenges
in maintaining investor confidence, and therefore both the companies and their
teams have encountered difficulties in advancing this ownership model. During
the past two years of stock market recession, Disney and AOL have seen their
stock fall steadily, and as a result, shareholders have called for new strategic
directions and the dumping of non-core assets. 125 One of the main problems
concerning publicly held companies is that their shareholders normally look for
quarterly or annual returns on their investments, but sports franchises tend to
appreciate in value over a longer term and therefore the shareholders' desires for
high returns are not met. 1 26 Moreover, the teams owned by public held media
companies are having problems similar to their parent companies in that AOL
Time Warner's three teams combined are not worth much more than MLB's
New York Yankees and Disney's two teams combined are worth about the same
as MILB's Baltimore Orioles. 127 Thus, many are beginning to believe that this
business model does not fit well with large publicly owned companies, and as a
result, investor confidence continues to spiral downward. 128 Often, these
companies' only hopes of recovering and regaining investor confidence is by
ridding themselves of and selling these sports teams, which add little to
corporate bottom
lines and often serve as more of a harm than a benefit to the
29
company. 1
With broadcasting structures now being pretty much set and
distribution channels built for these companies that have invested in sports
franchises, there's not much opportunity for growth in the course of their
ownership. 130 Compounding this is the fact that subscriber growth is slowing,
the airwaves are saturated with new channels, and escalating player salaries are
offsetting the savings from owning the programming content for these media
companies.' 3 ' This lack of growth further encourages the belief that the model
no longer works for publicly held media companies and forces many people to
12

See id. at 283.

122See id.
123 See

Cheffins, supra note 65, at 105.
Cheff'ms, supra note 53, at 283.
125 See Silverman, supra note 62, at 30.
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be skeptical about the future of publicly owned companies' interest in owning
sports franchises.' 32
Additionally, when a company goes public, ownership loses much of
the flexibility that autonomous owners of private companies are entitled to
enjoy.' 33 Furthermore, once the company goes public, the owner will relinquish
a certain amount of control over the business because investors and shareholders
134
will also now have a say in the form of voting rights and ownership of shares.
Depending on how much control the owner relinquishes, the company could
become susceptible to a hostile takeover, which would be quite troubling to the
owner of a sports franchise.' 35
D. Application of Public Company Ownership to Major League Baseball
In applying the advantages and disadvantages of public ownership in
the form of IPO's or public company ownership to Major League Baseball's
teams that are currently facing the threat of contraction, it's important to
understand that they are not the most sound investment at this point. These are
teams in significant debt with little hope of making a significant amount of
money, with a generally low fan base, and on the verge of either being
eliminated from baseball, managed by baseball (as the Expos were in 2001), or
being bought by new owners with the potential of moving them to a new city.
Ideally, one would say that they should just have an IPO or hope to get bought
and have their operations run by a publicly owned company with a significant
financial backing where a substantial amount of funds would be provided and
the possibility for construction of a new stadium to attract more fans would
exist.
However, for these three teams, the situation is just not that easy to
solve. While MLB now allows their teams to join the stock market, no more
than 49% of a team can be distributed by way of an IPO and voting rights of
publicly held shares must be restricted, thus reinforcing the league's notions of
leaving a majority share in private hands. 136 So, clearly, even though the league
amended rules to allow their teams to go public and join the stock market, its
preference still seems to be private ownership by local individuals. 3 7 MLB is
"concerned with the interlocking of the broadcast industry and team ownership"
and looks unfavorably upon publicly traded forms of ownership that may have
"fiduciary responsibilities that conflict with the interest of baseball, and that
require public financial disclosure."'' 3 8 They want owners who are committed to

132 See

id
Stroz, supranote 48, at 522.
id.
15 See id.
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137 See id
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operating the club "in the interest of baseball and not for outside business
activities" in their public corporations. 3 9
Another significant problem that these three teams will face in
attempting to find public ownership is their lack of public appeal. 40 Similar to
the British soccer situation in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there would
presumably be a substantial amount of adverse investor sentiment.' 4' Whether it
be an investor investing in an IPO or a public corporation buying the entire
team, these teams seemingly would not appeal to them because a vast amount of
time, money, and resources will need to be utilized just to keep the teams afloat,
notwithstanding making a profit. It does not seem as if too many investors
would be willing to buy into any of these three teams knowing that each have
been struggling for several years, and a lot of additional money will be needed
just to keep them running. Without a doubt, each of these teams are a huge risk
to invest in because of their continuous fitancial problems and the negative
sentiment that's been surrounding their operations for years will likely dissuade
many potential buyers. Additionally, investors also are probably well aware that
these investments will not yield high returns making them further skeptical and
probably unsatisfied with the thought of investing in either the Marlins, Twins,
or Expos.

IV. PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
A. History/Background
In the United States, private ownership by either individual investors or
privately-held corporations is the most popular form of ownership among
professional sports teams. 42
Additionally, unincorporated partnerships
composed of a handful of investors also are common for private ownership
structures. "43 According to Forbes, individual investors all privately own the
teams with the highest franchise values in their respective sports. 44 In Major
League Baseball, George Steinbrenner's New York Yankees are worth $730
million; in the National Basketball Association, Jerry Buss' Los Angeles Lakers
are worth $403 million; in the National Football League, Daniel Snyder's
Washington Redskins are worth $845 million; and in the National Hockey
45
League, Michael Ilitch's Detroit Red Wings are worth $266 million.
Internationally, some Japanese professional baseball teams and British
professional soccer teams are owned by privately-held corporations.
139 See id.

140 See Stroz, supranote 48, at 523.
141 See Cheffins,

supra note 53, at 283.
See Chefflms, supra note 53, at 272.
143 See id.
142

144 ForbesFranchise Values (Dec. 12, 2002), at
http://www.espn.go.com/sportsbusiness/s/forbes.htm].
145 See id.
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B. Advantages/ReasonsFor PrivateOwnership ofSports Franchises
There are several benefits and advantages that private ownership allows
for in professional sports. Often, private investors have a substantial amount of
capital, time, and managerial talent that allows them to successfully deal with
the business logistics of professional sports.14 6 Private investors often have a
vast amount of past business experience, and therefore, are more capable of
understanding the intricacies involved in owning a franchise. Usually, unlike
public corporations, the main focus of these individual investors is on the sports
team, and so they have a "long-term economic interest in a team's vitality and
work to ensure its continuity."'' 47 Additionally, private investors have more
autonomy and freedom to make decisions on operating the team, as opposed to
public corporations, because there are not as many stakeholders with a direct
financial interest in the private sector.148 The executives of a privately-held firm
have a greater ability to dictate corporate policy and have more control over the
decision-making
process than they would if they were part of a public
149
company.
Additionally, as long as professional sports teams are held via a
privately-held corporation or partnership, financial statements can remain
private. 10 Not having to disclose this financial information is a highly valued
feature of private ownership and deters unwanted publicity for the owners.' 51
By remaining private, owners do not have to worry about investor sentiment and
confidence.152 Private owners do not have to worry that investors might not be
interested in buying shares in the franchise because this is not an option since
the team is privately owned. 53 Furthermore, professional sports leagues,
especially MLB and the NFL, favor private ownership over public ownership, as
seen with
rules either prohibiting or severely limiting public ownership in their
154
sports.

C. Disadvantages/ProblemsWith Private Ownership of Sports Franchises
A problem that often plagues private ownership is greedy individuals
owning these franchises. In the course of their ownership, private owners often
want to minimize costs, pay players as little as possible, and charge fans the
highest ticket fees possible to attend games. 155 Additionally, these private
146 See Rosentraub, supra note 2, at 130.
147 See
148 See

id
Bacon, supranote 92, at 161.
149 See Cheffins, supranote 53, at 281.
0 See id. at 280.
151See id.
152 See id. at 282.
153See id.
154 See Cheffins, supranote 53, at 279.
155 See Rosentraub, supra note 2, at 130.
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owners are interested in maintaining "sovereignty over a particular market area"
and not allowing other teams from the same sport into their geographic area56
because they fear that these franchises might be competing for the same fans.
As a result, fans and the general public as a whole view those private owners as
being greedy and only interested in maximizing their profits without keeping the
community's interests in mind. Furthermore, by continuously raising the ticket
prices, they tend to hurt attendance because more and more people cannot afford
or are not interested in coming to multiple games for such a steep price.
Often, it is much more difficult for private owners to raise capital for
their franchises. Public companies usually have an easier time raising more
capital and incurring more debt in the course of their operations because they
have additional means, such as stock, to use as collateral during difficult
financial periods or when they need extra capital.' 57 For example, raising funds
to construct new stadiums or improve their existing ones is usually easier for
public corporations because they can issue shares of stock to the public to assist
in financing these projects. 58 Private investors on the other hand often need to
reach into their own personal funds to finance these expensive projects and
might not have the necessary capital available.
Additionally, as a private investor, you do not have an "exit option"
159
and cannot use the stock market to cash in on a portion of your investment.
Equity in a privately-held corporation can be extremely difficult to sell, and as a
result, it is much tougher to liquidate your investment.' 60 Private owners cannot
use the stock market as an "exit option" and distribute their shares as part of a
public offering. 161 Additionally, private owners and those in partnerships are
individually liable for all debts, which can often be quite costly to these
investors. 161
D. Application ofPrivate Ownership to MajorLeague Baseball
Without a doubt, Major League Baseball favors private ownership, in
the form of local individual owners, over all other ownership structures. 6 3 As
indicated by certain criteria provided by MLB, one sees their "intentions of
keeping the interests of baseball above that of outside interests, and maintaining
baseball's self-governance, profitability, and limited financial disclosure."'164
These criteria include the owner being committed to operating the club in the
65
best interests of baseball and not to support outside business activities.1
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Basically, the League is expressing their desire for private owners because it is
concerned with the possible ramifications of "the interlocking of the broadcast
industry and team ownership."' 166 Furthermore, Major League Baseball does not
want any of the teams' organizational and management structures conflicting
with the interests of baseball.1 67 The League looks unfavorably upon trusts,
non-profit, and publicly traded forms of ownership that may have fiduciary
responsibilities conflicting with baseball's interests, and requiring public
financial disclosure. 68 With private ownership, the possibility of public
ownership requiring financial disclosure is eliminated.
The demands of some private owners in Major League Baseball for
public assistance have reached new levels in that they insist on subsidies from
their host communities greater than their teams are worth. 16 9 For example,
Minnesota Twins' owner Carl Pohlad attempted to obtain $250 million from the
Minnesota state legislature for a state-of-the-art retractable roof stadium, even
though the team is only worth about $125 million. 70 As a result, communities
are wondering why they should give these private owners more money than the
team is actually worth simply to keep the franchise in town for another 10 to 15
years, instead of the fans and the community buying the franchise themselves
and ensuring its continued existence in the same place.' 7' These same questions
have been raised in Florida and Montreal with private owners asking the
community to provide more money than the franchise is worth. This makes them
look greedy and merely interested in owning the franchise to make a profit at the
expense of their community and the fans. Unfortunately, these maneuvers by
private owners often cause the fans to become upset and disinterested in the
game of
baseball because they feel that these franchises are taking advantage of
72
them. 1

V. PUBLIC OWNERSHIP-COMMUNITY OWNERSHIP

A. History/Background
Public ownership also exists in the form of community ownership,
where the main difference is that non-marketable securities are sold and the
public owns the majority of the stock. Essentially, community ownership begins
with a majority interest (70-75% of the team) of non-tradable stock being sold to

166 See id.

167See id.
'6

See id.

169Daniel Kraker and David Morris, Roots,Roots, Rootsfor the Home Team (Apr. 1998), at
http://www.newrules.org/resources/rootroots.html.
170See id.
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the general public. 173 A managing interest of approximately 25-30% is then sold
to a private management group or investor who operates the team, while
covering all the expenses and losses and retaining all the profits. 74 The team's
bylaws are then changed to require a super majority (3/4) of voters to move the
team, thereby rooting the team to the city and its fans. 175 This whole process is
based on a market test, where if the public does not respond within a year and
buy a threshold interest in the team, then it is quite apparent that the team will
not survive in its current city even with a new stadium. 176 If the sale to the
public does not work, the team is put back on the market and sold to another
private or public investor,
and the city recoups any initial investment that it
77
might have made. 1
In the United States, the NFL's Green Bay Packers utilize this
community ownership structure. 78 Additionally, both the MLB's Kansas City
Royals and Minnesota Twins have showed interest in utilizing this form of
ownership. 79 Internationally, three teams in the Canadian Football League
(CFL) --the Saskatchewan Roughriders, Winnipeg Blue Bombers, and the
Edmonton Eskimos- - use community ownership structures to operate their
teams. '°
Within the past decade, there have been several attempts on both the
state and federal level to introduce legislation promoting the expansion and
growth of community ownership in professional sports. In 1997, a bill was
introduced in Minnesota that enabled the state to purchase baseball's Twins, one
of the teams facing the threat of contraction, and transfer the club to a nonprofit
organization, which would have given a year to sell shares of stock in the
team. l18 However, the bill never came up for a vote. 2 More recently, there
was the introduction of the New York Sports Fan ProtectionAct, which is a bill
that would establish a State Sports Authority that could condemn a franchise
through eminent domain and sell shares in the team to the public if either the
cost of a stadium to the public exceeded the value of the
franchise or the
83
franchise took action to move from the state of New York.1
Furthermore, numerous pieces of legislation were introduced on the
federal level promoting the idea of community ownership within professional
173Lawmakers: You Can Own the Twins (Nov. 20, 2001), at
http://www.channel4000.comsports/stories/sports-twins- 108682720011120-121117.html.
174Kraker and Morris, The Myth of New Stadium Profits-Is it Time to Considerthe GreenBay
Alternative?, SHEPHERD ExPRESS (Feb. 12, 1998), at http://www.shepherdexpress.com/shepherd/19/07/headlines/cover-story.html.
175 See id.

176 See id.
177 See id.

178Kraker and Morris, Rooting the Home Team: Why the Packers Won't Leave and Why the Browns
Did,THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 38.
179 See id at 42.
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sports. The Give Fans a Chance Act of 2001 is a federal bill, which would
remove a professional league's broadcast-rights antitrust exemption if that
league prohibited a community or its fans from owning the team. 184 In
substance, the Act would forbid leagues from prohibiting community ownership.
Additionally, the Fairness in Antitrust in National Sports (FANS) Act of 2001
was introduced in response to Major League Baseball's attempt to contract and
eliminate the Minnesota Twins.'8 5 The purpose of this act is to amend the
Clayton Act to make the antitrust laws applicable to the elimination or relocation
of MLB franchises. 86 It would eliminate MLB's antitrust exemption8 7with
regard to the elimination or relocation of major league baseball franchises.
Currently, in the United States, the NFL's Green Bay Packers, who
188
were one of the league's best teams in the 1960's and throughout the 1990's,

are the only professional sports team owned by their fans.1 89 The Packers'
community ownership structure predates NFL rules prohibiting public
ownership.
Incorporated in 1923 as a private, non-profit, tax-exempt
organization, Article I of the Packers' bylaws states, "this association shall be a
community project, intended to promote community welfare ...its purposes
shall be exclusively charitable."' 9 In 1935, the Packers were reorganized as a
Wisconsin non-profit stock corporation. 19' At this time, the Green Bay Packers
Corporation was authorized to issue 300 shares of common stock. 192 Then, in
1950, when the Packers Corporation wanted to ensure its ability to remain a
long-term competitor in the NFL, the Corporation's stockholders authorized it to
issue up to 10,000 common shares of stock at $25 per share, to raise funds for
the Packers. 93 The Corporation's restated articles of incorporation stated that
no stockholder could own more than 200 shares and that the stock would pay no
dividends.' 94 From 1950 to November 1997, the Packers Corporation had

184For a link to the text of the Give Fansa Chance Act, see
http://www.newrules.org/sports/fans.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2002).
185See id.
186
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Regulation,at http://www.uwlax.edu/faculty/knowles/ecol 10/Tucker_13.rtf(last visited Feb. 13,
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approximately 1900 shareholders owning 4627 shares. 195 Then, in November
1997, the Packers' shareholders approved the issuance of new stock in
accordance with a 1000-for-i stock split. 196 In response to this new stock
offering, 106,000 Packers' fans bought stock at $200 per share, which generated
$24 million for the Corporation. 97 However, this new stock is largely
"ceremonial" because the new shareholders have diluted voting rights, no
198
possibility of profits, and receive no other special benefits.
A board of directors that is elected by the shareholders is in charge of
managing the business operations of the team. 99 The board must approve all
substantive changes, such as upgrading the scoreboards at Lambeau Field,
adding luxury boxes to the stadium, and building a new indoor practice
facility. 2°° Both President Bob Harlan and Executive Vice-President/General
Manager John Fabry have the authority to make all football operations
decisions. 1
One of the most significant features of the Packers' bylaws is that a
majority vote of the shareholders is necessary to relocate the franchise. 20 2 With
over 90% of the shareholders residing in Green Bay, all most likely avid Packers
fans, it is extremely unlikely that any shareholder would ever vote to relocate the
team. 0 3 As a result, community based ownership essentially serves as a
mechanism for preventing teams from moving out of town. The team can only
move through dissolution, and if this occurs the shareholders get back the
amount of money that they invested. 2° If a shareholder ever decides to sell his
or her stock, the Packers' bylaws state that the shares must be offered back to
the corporation first. 20 5 As a result of their corporate structure, the publicly
owned Green Bay Packers have become the most stable team in the NFL and the
city of Green Bay has never faced the threat of the team relocating.20 6
B. Advantages/ReasonsFor Community Ownership ofSports Franchises
There are several benefits and advantages that a community-based
ownership structure allows for, which are not inherent to the other ownership
structures in professional sports. Community owned franchises could help in
reversing the recent trend of franchise relocation that plays a major role in
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undermining the stability of these professional leagues. 20 7 The "unchecked
mobility" of these teams often hurt their respective sports by disappointing fans
throughout the world and their host cities as well.20 8 Furthermore, frequent
franchise relocation undermines the sport's "fan base, destroys team loyalties,
eliminates team rivalries, and increases the public sentiment that team owners
are greedy and self-motivated. ' '209 However, the certificate of incorporation and
bylaws of a community owned corporate franchise could play a significant role
in reversing this trend, because they could specifically state the conditions under
which the franchise would be allowed to move or be sold. 210 As seen with the
Packers, teams owned by residents of2their
community are highly unlikely to
1
move them away from that community. 1
Moreover, community-based ownership of professional sports teams is
desirable for the cities, their taxpayers, and the fans since this corporate entity is
largely self-funded, and it is not dependent on the host cities for huge
subsidies. 212 Cities use numerous public-financing mechanisms for funding
construction of new stadiums or renovations of existing facilities, and ultimately
the taxpayers bear the financial burden of all these subsidies.2 13 Unfortunately,
host cities bear the huge subsidy risk and in many instances are not rewarded for
their substantial economic investment when teams leave for a better deal that is
offered by another city. 214 However, community-owned franchises would
basically shift the burden from taxpayers to individuals who are interested in
owning a piece of a team in a particular community. 21 5 This shift in financing
increases the likelihood of a franchise staying in one city because the team's
shareholders are "highly motivated
to keep the team as a permanent fixture in
2 16
their city" due to their investment.
Additionally, community ownership often provides better opportunities
and greater ability for a city to start-up or acquire a professional franchise. Such
a form of ownership provides a way for cities that have a "large potential pool of
fan support" to overcome opposition to "whatever amount of public funding
may be necessary to acquire a team. 21 7 Such an alternative mechanism "with
its inherent high degree of fan support and largely self-funded nature, would
play a significant role in relieving the problems that cities face in providing the
appropriate level of subsidies necessary to attract a professional sports

"07Richard Sandomir, Owners' New Strategy: Take The Team and Run, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 14, 1996,
§ 8, at 1.
208See Hartel, supra note 191, at 600; see also Katherine C. Leone, No Team, No Peace: Franchise
Free Agency in the National FootballLeague, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 473, 476 (1997).
209See Leone, supra note 208, at 491.
210See Hartel, supra note 191, at 600.
211 See id at 601.

212See id.
213See Leone, supra note 208, at 485.
214See Hartel, supra note 191, at 602; see also Leone, supranote 208, at 491-92.
215 See Hartel at 602.
216See id.
217See id.
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franchise.2t 8 In large part, the fans would provide the appropriate funding
through their investments.
Additionally, in cities, where the team is a "permanent, rooted civic
asset," fans and citizens are seemingly much more willing to financially support
their team.219 If the fans receive a commitment from the team, they are much
more likely to "return loyalty with loyalty," as the fans of the 22Green
Bay
0
Packers have overwhelmingly demonstrated throughout their history.
Most importantly, community-owned franchises provide practical
solutions to the main obstacles that cities face when trying to encourage the
league to grant its area a new franchise. 221 Community-based ownership
provides fans with the "unique opportunity to build a team through their own
resources and to become owners of the franchise. 222 Moreover, with such
ownership rights comes "pride, love of the game, and loyalty" to the
professional league. 223 Additionally, community-owned teams would become
permanent fixtures in the area, similar to the Green Bay Packers, and this would
create substantial benefits for the league by increasing its stability. 224 Such a
form of ownership would also play an important role in reducing the existing
greed in the league by the current owners and would also allow the fans, who
have been long time supporters of the franchise, to have a role in owning it. This
would help keep the fans interested and loyal to their favorite teams.
C. Disadvantages/ProblemsWith Community Ownership of Sports Franchises
When attempting to implement community ownership, the major hurdle
that must be overcome is professional sports league rules prohibiting such forms
of ownership. All major sports leagues -baseball, basketball, football, and
hockey- either formally or informally prohibit community ownership. In 1961,
after "grandfathering" in the Packers' nonprofit structure, the NFL formally
banned community ownership at the same time it adopted a radical revenuesharing plan, which distributes all revenue from merchandise, television, and
gate receipts equally among all of its teams. 225 In the mid-1980's, Major League
Baseball outlawed public/community ownership through an informal resolution
when Joan Kroc wanted to donate her baseball team, the Padres, to the City of
San Diego.226 Furthermore, current MLB Commissioner Bud Selig has vowed
to "kill any community ownership proposal because it would be an awkward
arrangement for the league. 227
218
219

See id. at 604.
See Packers, supranote 188.

2'o See id.
21 See Hartel,
222 See id.
223See id.
224 See id.
225See Kraker
226 See Kraker
27 See Kraker

supranote 191, at 627.

and Morris, supra note 178, at 42.
and Morris, supra note 169, at http://www.newrules.org/resources/rootroots.html.
and Morris, supra note 178, at 42.
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However, in the case of the NFL, there have been slight glimmers of
hope of the league challenging their policy banning community ownership. This
policy was challenged in Sullivan v. NFL, were William H. Sullivan, the then
owner of the New England Patriots, brought an action against the NFL alleging
that the league violated antitrust laws by restricting owners of NFL franchises
from selling shares in their team to the public. 228 Sullivan, wanting to offer 49%
of the team to the public in the form of publicly traded stock to help in
overcoming financial difficulties and increasing debt burdens, requested that the
NFL either waive its public ownership prohibition or modify it to allow for
certain controlled sales to the public of minority interests in NFL franchises.229
As a result of the NFL failing to act on Sullivan's request, he brought a lawsuit,
where the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts entered judgment
for Sullivan, ruling that the NFL prohibition of public ownership violated the
Sherman Act. 230 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that Sullivan
had "presented sufficient evidence of harm to competition in the sale of
ownership interests in NFL clubs."23'
However, the First Circuit vacated and remanded the judgment of the
U.S. District Court in this case due to numerous prejudicial trial errors.2 32 Since
the Sullivan decision, no other court has decided the issue of whether the NFL
policy prohibiting public ownership of NFL teams violates Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, which prohibits "every agreement, conspiracy, or other concerted
activity in restraint of trade. 233 As a result, the First Circuit's antitrust analysis
of the NFL's prohibition of public ownership for existing NFL franchises
remains "the primary authority by which to challenge the NFL's effective
prohibition of public ownership for new NFL franchises. 234
The Supreme Court has developed two tests to determine if the
Sherman Act has been violated: 1) the "per se" test and 2) the "rule of reason"
test. 235 Under the "per se" test, a court will hold a business practice "per se"
unlawful only when the court can predict with certainty that the restraint caused
236
by the business practice violates the basic purposes of the Sherman Act.
Courts reserve "per se" invalidity for blatant restraints of trade that further no
basic purpose other than the impairment of competition.237 Such unlawful trade
and business practices, where the court will not look at the
possible business
23
price fixing, 239
justification for the restraint, include group boycotts,
228See Sullivan, supra note 98, at 1095.
229See id.
at 1095-1096.
230 See id.at 1091, 1096.
23'See id.at 1091.
232 See id.

233See Hartel, supra note 191, at 606.
24 See id.
235NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
236Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1387 (9t Cir. 1984) [hereinafter
Raiders] (citing United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972)).
237See Raiders, 726 F.2d at 1387.
238See, e.g.,
Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
239See, e.g.,
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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horizontal market division, 240 tying arrangements, 241 and concerted refusals to

deal .242
Restraints that do not fall within the "per se" category are instead
analyzed under the "rule of reason" test. 243 The "rule of reason" is a particularly

appropriate test when a court is confronted with an industry requiring
cooperation among its members in order to compete in the marketplace. 24 Due
to the unique character of professional sports,245 throughout history, courts have
generally rejected the application of the "per se" test and instead have applied
the "rule246of reason" test in deciding antitrust suits concerning League
practices.
The "rule of reason" test is a balancing test requiring the fact-finder to
decide whether, under all the circumstances of the case, the agreement "imposes
an unreasonable restraint on competition."' 247 Typically, an activity restrains
trade if its anti-competitive effects outweigh its legitimate business
justifications. 248 Before balancing the positive and negative effects on
competition of this activity, the plaintiff must "show that the challenged conduct
restrains competition. 249
In challenging the NFL's prohibition of
public/community ownership, the plaintiff must prove three elements in order to
establish a cause of action 50° These three elements include: (1) that there was
an agreement between two or more persons or distinct business entities; 251 (2)
the agreement is intended to harm or unreasonably restrain competition; 252 and
(3) the agreement actually causes injury to competition.253
240See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
24 See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
242See, e.g., Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930).
243Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
244See Raiders, supranote 237, at 1389, cert. deniedsub nom. Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum,
Inc. v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
245Lewis S. Kurlantzick, Thoughts on ProfessionalSports andthe Antitrust Law: Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Comm 'n v. NFL, 15 CoNN. L. REV. 183 (1983). (Discussing the impact of the
Raiders case, Professor Kurlantzick notes: "Professional sports teams do not fit neatly into
traditional models of industrial structure .... NFL teams are a hybrid form of economic animal both business rivals and partners. Unlike other industries, the success of each member of the pro
football industry depends, to a considerable extent, upon the success of all other members." Id. at
189).
246 See Raiders, supranote 237, at 1381.
247 Id. at 1391. See also Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). (Justice
Brandeis, who articulated the test that has been uniformly adopted in evaluating a restraint under the
"rule of reason," stated, "[tlhe true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition." Id. at 238).
248Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988).
'49 See Raiders, supranote 237, at 1391.
m See id.
251 See also National Soc. of Prof I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978).
252 See also Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (stating that a
plaintiff need not allege an intent on the part of co-conspirators to restrain trade if the purported
conspiracy has an anti-competitive effect).
253 See also Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 21-22 (1 Cir. 1990) (stating that
an agreement injures competition when it obstructs the achievement of one or more basic goals of
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Several reasons have been raised for banning public corporate
ownership/ community ownership in professional sports.
Former NFL
Commissioner Pete Rozelle stated that this form of ownership would make it
"impossible for the NFL to maintain control of the League."2 54 Rozelle was
concerned that public/community ownership would divide control of a team
among thousands of individuals making it "difficult, if not impossible," for the
NFL to control who owned the franchise.255
Additionally, the former
Commissioner claimed that this form of ownership could make the effective
management of a team difficult by creating a conflict between the interests of
the team's shareholders and those of the NFL.256
However, prohibiting this form of ownership could be problematic for
the NFL because they are essentially limiting who may compete for ownership
of an NFL franchise and this could violate the Sherman Act.257 The Sullivan
court discussed how restricting all sales of a particular type of ownership
interest, such as public/community ownership, could compromise and hurt "the
entire competitive process for the buying and selling of a club ownership. 258
While there is a blatant intent to harm competition, the Sullivan Court stated that
whether the NFL's policy of prohibiting public/corporate ownership actually
injures competition is ultimately a question of fact at the trial.259
The Sullivan court found that the NFL's public/community ownership
prohibition potentially harms two types of consumers: 1) individuals who want
to purchase stock in an NFL franchise; and 2) franchise owners, such as
Sullivan, wishing to obtain investment capital in the market for public
financing. 260 As a result, the League's prohibition of this form of ownership
deprives fans by basically restricting "the output of a product- a share in an NFL
franchise., 26' One can look to the successful public offerings of the NBA's
Boston Celtics in 1986, the NHL's Florida Panthers in 1996, and MLB's
Cleveland Indians in 1998 to see examples of the high level of fan interest in
buying ownership in professional sports teams.262 As a result, the NFL's
prohibition policy injures competition in the relevant market by causing the
market to be "unresponsive to consumer preference. 263
Furthermore, at trial, it's quite likely that a jury could find that the
NFL's prohibition of public/community ownership hinders efficiency in the

competition, including, lower prices, increased output, an preventing more efficient production
methods in the relevant market).
254 See Corporately Yours, supranote 99, at 15.
2' See id.
26 See id.
257 See Sullivan, supra note 98, at 1100.
258See id.
259See id.
260Seeid at 1101.
261 See id.
262 See Sandra Livingston and Zach Schiller, NationalStock Plan is Jacobs'DoublePlay:Indians
Owner Gets Millions with No Loss of Control,PLAIN DEALER (CLEVELAND), Apr. 20, 1998, at IA.
263 See Board of Regents, supranote 235, at 87.
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relevant market and in the League. 264 The NFL hinders efficiency by
"preventing certain highly skilled and experienced individuals from owning
teams," where such individuals may not have the resources to buy a team
privately. 265 Additionally, the policy does not allow for certain types of
management structures, which may be more efficient and also produce higher
quality teams than the current teams in the League.266 Moreover, history shows
that increased access to capital can play a significant role in improving a team's
operations and performance.2 67
With the NFL's policy prohibiting
public/community ownership restricting access to capital, the NFL franchises'
ability to be competitive is limited.268
However, while community ownership may be necessary for some
franchises in professional sports leagues, many believe that by itself it is an
"insufficient remedy" for the problems currently faced. 269 The NFL, for
example, is a revenue-sharing league, where all network television income,
which is in the billions, is shared equally among the thirty-two teams.270 In
addition, revenues from the sale of game tickets are split 60/40 between the
home and visiting teams, respectively. 271 But non-ticket, luxury-box stadium
revenue is the main exception to this revenue-sharing system.272 It is quite
likely that the Green Bay Packers, the quintessential example of community
ownership in professional
sports, would not have survived without the NFL's
273
revenue-sharing policy.
The three other major professional sports in the U.S. and Canada baseball, basketball, and hockey- are often tied to "the fortunes of their owners
and the skybox-revenue generating capacity of their stadiums. 274 In recent
years, many of the most successful and victorious teams in these leagues have
had the largest payrolls and new stadiums built for them.275 However, as these
same large-market teams continue winning, the small-market teams often
struggle and usually are not as successful. As a result, fan enthusiasm erodes
and this often hurts the league's financial vitality. 276 Many believe that for
baseball, basketball, and hockey to maintain a high level of competitiveness,
"small-market vitality," and fan support throughout the world, these leagues
277
must adopt a revenue-sharing plan that is similar to the NFL's.
2'

See id at 85.

265See Sullivan, supra note 98, at 1101-02.
2

See id at 1102.

267Dave Anderson, Jones Successfully Buys NFL Crown, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 29, 1996,

at B4.
268 See Sullivan, supra note 98, at 1102.
269 See Kraker and Morris, supra note 178, at 43.
270 See Ostfield, supra note 81, at 604.
271 See id.
272 Sanjay Jose Mullick, Browns to Baltimore: FranchiseFree Agency and the New Economics of
the NFL, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1, 16 (1995).
273 See Kraker and Morris, supranote 178, at 43.
274 See id.
275See id.
276 See id.
277See id.
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In 2002, Major League Baseball took some steps towards implementing
a revenue-sharing plan. The most important aspect of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement that was reached between baseball players and owners on August 30,
2002 was the revenue-sharing plan.178 This plan requires MLB teams to share
34% of their locally generated revenues, which was an increase from 20% in the
previous agreement. §9 This money will be divided equally among the 30 MLLB
franchises and is intended to help the middle-market teams. 280 While the owners
are not required to use all of this money on player salaries, MLB Commissioner
Bud Selig has the power to impose sanctions if the teams attempt to pocket their
revenue-sharing payments without improving the franchise. 28'
However, revenue-sharing alone will not force or create a larger
incentive for sports franchises to remain in the same community. This is
because since revenue from corporate suites, club seats, and various other
stadium sources are excluded from the revenue-sharing plan, owners often "feel
compelled to demand new stadiums" with more and larger skyboxes. 282 When
the Cleveland Browns left Ohio for Baltimore in 1995, a compromise was
reached enabling Cleveland to retain the Browns name and the NFL promised
Cleveland that it would receive an expansion team within three years.283 Such a
compromise could be the third component, combined with community
ownership and revenue-sharing, of a comprehensive solution to the ownership
problems in professional sports. 2 4
Under such a compromise, while franchises would have the freedom to
move, the league will be penalized if teams do relocate. 28 5 For example, if Los
Angeles and Cleveland were granted expansion franchises when their teams left,
each NFL team's share of the League's total revenue would decrease because of
the two additional teams joining the League.286 By moving their teams to
increase short-term revenue, the owners of the Los Angeles Rams and the
Cleveland Browns will decrease the average value of NFL franchises in the long
run.28 7 Therefore, owners must weigh the short-term benefits of relocation
against the long-term financial advantages of league stability and assess what
would be best in these circumstances.288
D. Application of Community Ownership to Major League Baseball
In applying the advantages and disadvantages of community ownership
to Major League Baseball's teams currently facing the threat of contraction, it is
278 See Simpson, supra note 4, at 7.
28
281

See id.
See id.
See id.

282

See Kraker and Morris, supra note 178, at 43.

279
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important to understand that such a form of ownership could be quite beneficial
for these struggling franchises. Community ownership in Major League
Baseball would provide these struggling franchises with a better opportunity to
continue their operations because the community would have a rooted interest in
supporting and operating the team. Moreover, these franchises could look to the
Green Bay Packers and a few minor league baseball teams for examples of
successfully operated community-owned teams.
Even more important is the fact that if contraction occurs, it will hurt
baseball's bottom line, thus demonstrating the need for community-owned
franchises. 289 According to 1999 statistics, if Montreal and Minnesota, the
League's two smallest revenue-producing teams, are eliminated and the
remaining "revenue pie" is divided twenty-eight ways instead of thirty ways, it
will only increase each team's split of revenue-sharing by about $2 million,
which is equivalent to the average salary of a single player.290 Furthermore,
eliminating those two teams will be expensive because it will cost at least $250
million, or about $9 million per remaining team, to buy out the two major league
ownership groups along with their minor league team owners. 291 As a result,
contraction will be a "money loser" for each remaining team for at least the next
few years and the League.292
Throughout their franchises' history, there is evidence that community
ownership could be a success in Florida, Minnesota, and Montreal. South
Florida, where the Florida Marlins are located, is a large market with a strong
Latino population base who are more inclined to follow baseball than fans in
most metropolitan areas.293 Combine this strong Latino population base with the
large number of retirees from other states where interest in baseball is high, it is
quite likely that these fans would have a strong desire to invest in the Marlins.
Additionally, in 1997, when the Marlins won the National League Wild Card
and then went on to win the World Series, the franchise had the fifth-largest
attendance in all of Major League Baseball. 294 Today, the team has strong
young talent and it is likely that they will be competitive in the very near future.
So there is a definite upside to investing in the Florida Marlins. 295 The market
demographics of the talent rich Marlins are major reasons why community
ownership could be a success in Florida.
Despite being near the bottom of most revenue rankings and total
payroll, the Minnesota Twins were in first place during much of the 2001 season
and won the American League's (AL) Central Division along with advancing to
the AL Championship Series in 2002.296 These highly successful results

289Chris Isidore, No Gain in ContractionPain(Nov. 6, 2001), at
http://www.money.cnn.com/2001/11/06/news/column sportsbiz/index.html.
290See id.
29' See id.
292See id.
293See id.
294 See id.
295See id.
29

See Simpson, supra note 4, at 33.
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definitely hurt the argument that they cannot compete and should therefore be
eliminated from baseball.297 Furthermore, a 78% increase in attendance in 2001
due to the team's success coupled with their low payroll brings claims that they
are operating with significant losses into doubt. 298 Additionally, the Twins were
the first American League franchise to ever draw 3 million fans in a single
season and in the period from 1988 through 1994, they had a larger attendance
than the large-market and highly successful New York Yankees. 29 Minnesota
was also World Series Champions in 1987 and 1991, which serves as another
indication of the franchise's success. 3° Moreover, some supporters of the
Twins organized a group called Fans Answer to New Stadium (F.A.N.S.), which
is "devoted to pursuing community ownership of the Twins," so there is definite
support amongst the fans for such a ownership structure in Minnesota. 301 As a
result, with Minnesota's high level of fan support and history of success on the
field, it is quite likely that the community would invest in the Twins and allow
the franchise to remain in Minnesota.
Due to ownership problems, Major League Baseball took over the
operations of the Montreal Expos in February 2002 and the League currently
owns the franchise. 30 2 However, community ownership would definitely be a
valid and beneficial option for this team. As recently as 1982, the team was
among the league leaders in attendance drawing 2.3 million fans, so there is
some evidence of fan support in the city of Montreal.3 °3 Furthermore, the
Canadians, the city's NHL team, are immensely popular among the fans and
have sold out crowds at their arena regularly throughout their long history.
Clearly, Montreal fans are interested in supporting their teams. Additionally,
throughout the Expos' history, they have had highly competitive, talent rich
teams, including in the 1994 MLB strike-shortened season when they finished in
first place and were favorites to make the World Series. Unfortunately, in the
seasons after 1994, financial difficulties forced the team to rid themselves of
their talented veteran star players in trades for unproven minor leaguers and as a
result, attendance significantly dropped. 30 4 However, if a community ownership
structure had been in place at this time, it is quite likely that many of the players
297 See Isidore, supra note 289.
298 See id
299 Chris Isidore, ContractionBuilt on Myths (Nov. 23, 2001), at

http://www.money.cnn.com/2001/ 11/23/news/column-sportsbizlindex.html.
1ooSee Simpson, supra note 4, at 26.
301Brad Zellar, The Bleacher Bum's Don Quixote (Sept. 9. 1998), at
http://www.citypages.com/databank/l9/927/article6002.asp. Significantly, the group's community
ownership model received legislative backing from two Democratic legislators State Senator Ellen
Anderson of St.Paul and Representative Phyllis Kahn of Minneapolis, who have long advocated
community ownership of the Twins. See id. State Sen. Anderson says, "Community ownership is
very different than the other ownership proposals on the table. First of all, it helps fans play a part in
the process. It gives them ownership, literally and figuratively. It creates a structure that guarantees
the Minnesota Twins will stay in Minnesota." See Lawmakers: You Can Own the Twins, supra note
173.
302 See Simpson, supranote 4, at 17.
303 See Isidore, supra note 35.
3 See Simpson, supranote 4, at 17.
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would remain because the fans approved and enjoyed watching the Expos play
during this period. Additionally, in 2002, the team was in contention throughout
much of the season to win the National League East or possibly a Wild Card
spot. 30 5 Young talent combined with a history of good fan support are reasons
why a community ownership structure would interest Montreal.
Granted, some argue that cultural differences in Montreal and Canada
as a whole are another factor working against the citizens supporting a Major
League Baseball team.3 °6 However, one only needs to look towards the
Canadian Football League, where three of the League's teams successfully
utilize community ownership structures to operate their franchises.30 7 These
three community-owned teams are more successful than those that are owned by
private investors. 30 8 Additionally, these teams have been "fan-owned" since
before 1950, so for greater than fifty years, these teams have been supported by
fans throughout Canada. 30 9 Furthermore, as already mentioned, the Montreal
Canadians also had a long history of immense fan support. There's been much
discussion of moving the Expos to Washington, D.C., where a major league
stadium is available to play in, or to a Northern Virginia suburb, where a new
park would need to be built.310 But, MLB's Baltimore Orioles have vowed to
veto a move to this, their, area. Also, in today's fluctuating economy, it's
tougher to "find examples of municipal largess in the construction of new
stadiums. 33 ' Consequently, a community ownership structure deserves an
opportunity to attempt to turn around the struggling Expos and keep them in
Montreal.
However, the franchises in Florida, Minnesota, and Montreal do face
some obstacles that must be overcome before a community ownership structure
can be successfully implemented. First, Major League Baseball's prohibition on
fan ownership must be overturned.31 2 Legislative acts, such as the Give Fans a
Chance Act (HR 590), would accomplish the goal of overturning baseball's
prohibition of fan ownership. 313 This bill forbids any of the professional
leagues, MLB, NBA, NFL, and NHL, from prohibiting community ownership,
and would withdraw the leagues' antitrust privileges if the fans were prohibited
from owning a franchise.31 4 Additionally, the bill requires teams to provide their
communities with 180 days notice of proposed relocation, durin§ which time the
community can put together an offer to retain the franchise. 3' This bill also
requires that leagues consider factors, such as fan loyalty and whether the
305See id.

306Chris Kahrl, The Daily Prospectus: ContractionAction (March 7, 2001), at

http://www.baseballprospectus.com/news/20010307daily.html.
307See Kraker and Mortis, supra note 169.
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community
is opposed to the relocation, before approving the relocation of a
3 16
franchise.

Moreover, Major League Baseball needs to continue enhancing the
revenue-sharing agreement for community ownership to be a success. The
growing consensus among MLB owners is that greater revenue-sharing is "a
must for the overall well-being" of baseball.317 Bob Costas, NBC's awardwinning sports broadcaster, says, "the single most important factor for ensuring
baseball's success in the future is for the sport to embrace a more
comprehensive revenue-sharing plan." 318Granted, the League did enhance the
Agreement with the Collective Bargaining Agreement reached on August 30,
2002 by requiring teams to share 34% of their locally generated revenues.31 9
This agreement runs through December 19, 2006, so it will be interesting to see
if it is successful
in allowing middle and small market teams to attain financial
320
stability.
Major League Baseball can look towards the NFL's revenue-sharing
plan, which "distributes revenues from merchandise sales, broadcasting, and a
portion of gate receipts evenly among all teams." '321 This plan has been
successful in allowing small-town teams to survive. The NFL understands that
media revenue comes largely due to the parity that the League has achieved
since revenue sharing.322 For the most part, such parity has not occurred in
baseball because teams, such as the Yankees, with the largest payroll usually
win.32 3 The NFL, on the other hand, is more competitive due to its revenuesharing plan. This allowed more franchises an opportunity to win, as evidenced
by the recent various Super Bowl Champions. Major League Baseball can
emulate such a plan to assist financially struggling franchises, such as the
Florida Marlins, Minnesota Twins, and Montreal Expos, while allowing for the
fans to have an ownership role in the teams.
Additionally, Major League Baseball could implement a plan similar to
that of the NHL to assist the Montreal Expos. In an effort to stop franchises
from relocating from Canada to the U.S., the NHL created a revenue-sharing
plan that was designed to reimburse Canadian teams for the currency imbalance
between the two countries.324 Funds for this Canadian plan come from the
league-generated television, licensing, and sponsorship revenues. 325 To qualify
for this plan, the Canadian hockey teams must be in the bottom half of league
revenues and have revenues that are at least 80% of the league average.326 If the
franchises do not meet these criteria, they could qualify instead by selling a
316 See id.
317 BOB COSTAS, FAIR BALL: A FAN'S CASE FOR BASEBALL 192 (Broadway Books 2001).

318See id. at 63.
319See Simpson, supranote 4, at 7.
320 See id. at 8.

321See Kraker and Morris, supra note 169.
32 See id.
323See id.

324See Much, supra note 1, at 210.
325 See id.
326 See id.
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defined number of season tickets, luxury suites, and dasherboards.327 Such a
plan combined with community ownership could be a way of financially
reviving the Expos.

VI. CONCLUSION

Of the four different ownership structures in domestic and international
professional sports leagues - -public company, community-based, private, and
single entity- - it seems as if community-based ownership would work
extremely well in helping to prevent contraction from occurring in Major
League Baseball. In MLB's current situation, public ownership by publicly held
corporations along with private ownership is simply ineffective at alleviating the
financial difficulties faced by some of the franchises. Alternatively, ownership
of all the teams, single entity ownership, by Major League Baseball would be
extremely impractical because it would require the League to buy back all of the
teams from the current owners, something very few baseball owners are likely to
allow. Single entity ownership is more appropriate for newer, upstart leagues,
such as Major League Soccer (MLS), where the League is the employer of all its
players as opposed to individual owners.328 Therefore, one must look towards
community ownership for solutions. One of the most significant advantages of
community ownership is that it would "remove the monstrous egos and
nineteenth-century capitalistic mentalities of existing ownership from the game"
of baseball.329
Taking into account all of the litigation costs and the buy-out costs of
the major and minor league teams, along with the negative impact on fans and
players, contraction is a potentially disastrous approach to solving and helping
alleviate financial problems that domestic (Florida Marlins, Minnesota Twins,
and Tampa Bay Devil Rays) and international (Montreal Expos) baseball teams
are encountering. 33
Professional sports franchises should be "regarded as
public utilities rather than as pieces of private property, and they should be
regarded as a public trust.",331 Therefore, Major League Baseball must overturn
its prohibition on community/fan ownership, and allow the fans to make
investments to keep their teams in their community. This would create more
franchise stability, a goal of the league.332 The three essential elements to
keeping teams rooted in the same city are "community ownership, a revenuesharing plan ensuring league-wide competition and the vitality of small-market
327 See

id

328 Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 97 F. Supp.2d 130, 131 (D. Mass. 2000); Paul D. Abbott,

Antitrust and Sports-Why Major League Soccer Succeeds Where Other Sports Leagues Have Failed,
8 SPORTS LAW. J. 1, 3 (2001).
329 Richard C. Crepeau, If! were Commissioner, SPORTSJONES MAGAZINE (July 8, 1998), at
http://www.sportsjones.com/sport&society3.html.
330 See Noll, supranote 29, at 9.
331 See Crepeau, supra note 329.
332 See Much, supra note 1, at 27.
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teams, and a form of mandated expansion in the future for cities whose team
owners move in the face of demonstrated fan support. 333 Community
ownership, combined with effective revenue-sharing, will prevent teams from
leaving home in Major League Baseball along with saving taxpayers substantial
amounts of money by protecting fans and taxpayers from owners who bid their
team out to the city that offers the best stadium and the biggest subsidy.334 In
the end, community/fan ownership could very well be the solution that Major
League Baseball has been searching for to allow its struggling franchises to
become successful teams.

333See Kraker and Morris, supranote 169.
334See Kraker and Morris, supranote 178, at 38.
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